Introduction
Fix an arbitrary nonatomic probability space ( ; ; ). The set of all random variables de…ned over this space, denoted L 0 ( ), consists of all -measurable functions X : ! R. Most of the literature on preferences over random variables restricts attention to rather small subsets of random variables such as, e.g., random variables with …nite support. Whenever larger classes of random variables are considered they typically belong to a technically convenient space L p ( ) L 0 ( ), with 1 p 1, such that X 2 L p ( ) with p < 1 if, and only if, the integral
exists. For example, L 1 ( ) collects all random variables with …nite expected value; L 2 ( ) collects all random variables with …nite variance; and L 1 ( ) denotes the set of all bounded random variables. This paper takes an extreme stand and considers preferences over ALL random variables whereby we endow L 0 ( ) with the metric topology of convergence in probability.
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For this large space we establish that continuity and convexity cannot be simultaneously satis…ed for non-trivial and complete preferences (Theorem 1). If we want to model nontrivial preferences over the random variables in L 0 ( ), we must thus give up at least one of the three fundamental principles of continuity, convexity, or completeness, respectively. Under the additional assumption of transitivity, Theorem 2 establishes that continuity is neither compatible with quasi-concave nor with quasi-convex preferences. It is also not compatible with preference for diversi…cation (Theorem 3). For standard utility representations our incompatibility results imply the following restrictions:
2 Any non-trivial expected utility representation with
for all X 2 L 0 ( ) is neither compatible with a concave nor with a convex utility function u.
Any non-trivial Choquet expected utility representation with
1 Our analytical …ndings can be analogously derived for the 'smaller'L p ( ) spaces with 0 < p < 1 (cf. Remark 3). 2 The …rst restriction is a special case of the second one. For the formal de…nition of Choquet integration with respect to the non-additive probability measure (=capacity) see Section 4.
for all X 2 L 0 ( ) is neither compatible with (i) a concave utility function u combined with a convex capacity nor with (ii) a convex utility function u combined with a concave capacity .
Consequently, there cannot exist any expected utility representation over all random variables that expresses global risk-aversion (or global risk-seeking, for that matter). Neither can there exist a Choquet expected utility representation over all random variables which expresses global risk-aversion combined with global ambiguity/uncertainty aversion (or global risk-seeking combined with global ambiguity/uncertainty seeking). 3 One possible way of dealing with this incompatibility result is to give up on continuous utility representations altogether and consider complete preferences over all random variables that are convex but not continuous (cf. Examples 4 and 5 in Section 5). From an applicational point of view, however, the lack of a continuous utility representation is not very attractive.
In case one wants to keep continuous utility representations, there are two alternative approaches for getting around the incompatibility between convexity and continuity. The …rst approach is to give up complete preferences on L 0 ( ). By restricting attention to suitable subsets of random variables, continuity and convexity may become compatible for preferences that are complete for these subsets only (cf. Examples 2 and 3 in Section 5). A straightforward example for this approach would be preferences on L 1 ( ) that are represented by the random variables'expected values. These preferences are (weakly) convex and continuous as well as complete on L 1 ( ) (but not on L 0 ( )!) because, by de…nition, every random variable in L 1 ( ) comes with an expected value. For an example of convex and continuous preferences that are complete for the non-negative random variables in L 1 ( ), let us quote from Nielsen (1984) : "The conclusion of an exchange between Ryan (1974) and Arrow (1974) was that if u is a concave and increasing function on the non-negative real line, and if Z is a random variable on the non-negative real line with …nite expected value, then the expected value of u (Z) is …nite."(p.202)
The second approach is to give up on convex preferences by restricting attention to utility functions u that are bounded and therefore neither concave nor convex (cf. Examples 6 and 7 in Section 5). Peter Wakker (1993) already re ‡ects on these two alternative approaches while exploring the role of bounded utility in Savage's (1954) The main insight from our analysis is that the con ‡ict between the three fundamental principles of (i) continuity, (ii) convexity, and (iii) completeness is not speci…c to any given utility representation such as, e.g., expected or, more generally, Choquet expected utility. Instead, this con ‡ict is a mathematical necessity that a¤ects any model of preferences over random variables.
4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our formal framework. Section 3 derives our main incompatibility results whose implications for utility representations are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents several examples which illustrate our analytical …ndings. Finally, in Section 6 we argue in favor of our topological choice compared to alternative topologies whose de…nitions of continuity would be compatible with convexity. All formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Our topological space of all random variables
We endow the set of all random variables L 0 ( ) with the topology of convergence in probability (cf. Chapters 13.10 and 13.11 in Aliprantis and Border 2006) . This topology is generated by the translation
That is, for any sequence of random variables fX n g 1 n=1 we have that
In Section 6 we will come back to our topology of choice and compare it to alternative topologies in the light of our analytical results. 4 Another example for this con ‡ict are risk measures from the mathematical …nance literature. By our incompatibility result, there cannot exist risk measures de…ned over all random variables that are simultaneously convex and continuous (cf. Example 7 in Section 5). 5 The distance between any two random variables is obviously zero under this (essential) metric whenever both random variables coincide -almost everywhere; that is, we distinguish between equivalence classes of -measurable functions rather than between functions themselves.
Note that L 0 ( ) is a vector space because the operations of addition and scalar multiplication for all its members are well de…ned. To state the obvious,
so that the 'mixture operation'on L 0 ( ) is an 'averaging'of real-valued outcomes in a given state.
6
Recall that a subset of random variables L L 0 ( ) is convex if, and only if,
Next recall that the interior of a given subset of a topological space is the largest (in the sense of set-inclusion) open set included in this subset. The following proposition will be crucial for deriving our subsequent incompatibility result.
Proposition 1. The only convex subset of L 0 ( ) with non-empty interior is the set 
Remark 1. Our proof of Proposition 1 uses the whole space L 0 ( ) and it does not necessarily go through for large subsets of L 0 ( ) (but see Remark 3). Consider for example the subset of L 0 ( ) that only contains non-negative random variables 
On the other hand, there exist non-zero continuous linear functionals which separate points from closed convex subsets for the locally convex spaces L p ( ) with 1 p 1 (Corollary 5.80 in Aliprantis and Border 2006) . Proposition 1 can thus not be extended to L p ( ) spaces with 1 p 1. As a consequence, our incompatibility results will not apply to these spaces.
Remark 3. Note that L p ( ) spaces with 0 < p < 1 endowed with the metric
are also locally non-convex spaces on which only 0 exists as continuous linear functional (Theorem 1 in Day 1940) . The statement of Proposition 1 can be shown to hold also for L p ( ) spaces with 0 < p < 1 (for a proof see paragraph 1.47 in Rudin 1991).
As a consequence, our subsequent incompatibility results obtained for L 0 ( ) can be analogously derived for L p ( ) spaces with 0 < p < 1.
3 Main results
Incompatibility of convexity and continuity
Consider a binary preference relation on L 0 ( ) whereby we treat random variables as identical objects if they coincide -almost everywhere. The standard interpretations and notational conventions apply: X Y means that Y is at least as desirable as X; an agent is indi¤erent between X and Y , denoted X Y , i¤ X Y and Y X; in addition, we have strict preference, i.e., X Y , whenever X Y holds whereas Y X does not. We assume that is asymmetric (i.e., for all X; Y 2 L 0 ( ), X Y implies not Y X) and that is re ‡exive (i.e., for all X 2 L 0 ( ), X X). At this point, we neither assume completeness nor transitivity of on L 0 ( ) (see below).
Let us introduce the super-level (=weakly better) set of X 2 L 0 ( ) which contains all random variables that are at least as desirable as X:
Similarly, the sub-level (=weakly worse) set of X 2 L 0 ( ) contains all random variables that are weakly less desirable than X:
Note that, by re ‡exivity of , both sets s (X) and S (X) are non-empty for all X 2 L 0 ( ).
Next consider the following de…nitions of possible properties that a preference relation on L 0 ( ) may or may not satisfy.
are closed sets with respect to the topology of convergence in probability.
Without non-triviality the preference relation is not very interesting. By completeness, the decision maker is capable of making decisions in any situation. Although completeness might not always be plausible in empirical situations 7 , the whole point of this paper is to assume that a decision maker may have preferences over all random variables in L 0 ( ) and study the consequences of this assumption.
In behavioral terms continuity ensures that small changes, with respect to our chosen metric d 0 , will not lead to abrupt changes in a decision maker's choice. More precisely, d 0 -continuity ensures that whenever a sequence of random variables fY k g k2N with X Y k for all k converges in probability to a random variable Y , then also X Y , i.e., preferences will not be reversed in the limit. From an applicational perspective, d 0 -continuity is necessary for any representation of complete preferences on L 0 ( ) by some continuous utility function (see Section 4). 7 In support of the empirical relevance of incomplete preferences see, e.g., Danan et al. (2015) and references therein.
S-convexity means that the decision maker likes to mix over the outcomes of random variables; a feature that is closely associated with behavioral concepts like risk-or/and uncertainty aversion as well as preference for diversi…cation. s-convexity means the opposite and is associated with a risk-or/and uncertainty seeking and aversion against diversi…cation.
To sum up: None of these …ve properties is behaviorally implausible (whereby Sconvexity is empirically far more relevant than s-convexity). Nevertheless, convexity and continuity turn out to be incompatible with one another whenever preferences are non-trivial and complete.
Theorem 1. Consider a binary preference relation on L 0 ( ) that is non-trivial and complete.
(a) The preference relation cannot simultaneously satisfy d 0 -continuity and S-convexity.
(b) Neither can simultaneously satisfy d 0 -continuity and s-convexity.
(c) If non-triviality or completeness are dropped, then might simultaneously satisfy d 0 -continuity and S-convexity (resp. s-convexity).
Sketch of the proof (for details see the Appendix): De…ne the strictly better and strictly worse sets of X 2 L 0 ( ) as follows
Completeness ensures that the topological structure of
closed, sets with respect to the preference relation so that Proposition 1 becomes applicable (cf. Remark 1). In particular, by completeness, d 0 -continuity implies that the sets S (X) and s (X) must be open in the topology of convergence in probability. But by Proposition 1, S (X) and s (X) cannot be open if they are non-empty, convex, strict subsets of L 0 ( ). Non-triviality ensures non-emptiness of S (X) and s (X) as
Quasi-concave and quasi-convex preferences
Note that the incompatibility result of Theorem 1 does not require transitivity of which is de…ned as follows:
Transitivity is a standard rationality requirement for economic agents that precludes the possibility of simple money pumps (cf. Cubit and Sugden 2001). Next consider the following possible properties of preferences.
The concept of quasi-concavity-formally de…ned as "uncertainty aversion"over acts in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework-goes back to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989, Axiom A.5 ) and Schmeidler (1989) . 8 Because our formal de…nition of quasi-concavity applies to the outcomes of random variables, the meaning of our de…nition is di¤erent from the original one formulated for the Anscombe-Aumann framework.
Note that S-convexity implies quasi-concavity. Similarly, s-convexity implies quasiconvexity. In what follows we establish that these relationships also hold in the other direction whenever transitivity is satis…ed.
Proposition 2. Assume that on L 0 ( ) is complete and transitive.
(a) Then quasi-concavity implies S-convexity.
(b) Then quasi-convexity implies s-convexity.
Combining Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 gives the following results.
Theorem 2. Assume that is non-trivial, complete, transitive, and d 0 -continuous.
(a) Then must violate quasi-concavity.
(b) Then must violate quasi-convexity.
8 As motivation for his de…nition, Schmeidler (1989) writes: "Intuitively, uncertainty aversion means that "smoothing" or averaging utility distributions makes the decision maker better o¤. Another way is to say that substituting objective mixing for subjective mixing makes the decision maker better o¤." (p.582) For an alternative approach to uncertainty aversion de…ned over random variables (i.e., Savage acts) rather than over Anscombe-Aumann acts see Epstein (1999) .
Preference for diversi…cation
Eddie Dekel (1989) has introduced the following de…nition in the context of portfolio choices:
Quasi-concavity implies preference for diversi…cation. The proof of the following result establishes that preference for diversi…cation implies quasi-concavity under transitivity and d 0 -continuity. 
Implications for utility representations
This section assumes that preferences on L 0 ( ) are represented by some utility functional.
Assumption 1. Fix some non-trivial and complete preference relation on L 0 ( ) and suppose that there exists some functional U :
We say that U is continuous (in probability
whereas we have for quasi-convex U that
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. If U is continuous, then U can neither be quasi-concave nor quasi-convex.
In the remainder of this section we discuss implications for expected utility and Choquet expected utility, respectively.
Expected utility
Suppose that the utility representation (15) is of the expected utility (EU) form, i.e., for all X 2 L 0 ( ),
for some utility function u : R ! R. Since the EU representation (18) is continuous, the represented preferences satisfy d 0 -continuity. Next observe that quasi-concavity of EU preferences holds if u is concave thereby formally expressing risk-aversion of the EU decision maker. Conversely, quasi-convexity of EU preferences holds if u is convex thereby expressing risk-seeking. By Proposition 4, we thus obtain the following result. Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds such that U is of the EU form (18).
Then the utility function u can neither be concave nor convex.
By Corollary 1, an EU representation over all random variables can thus neither express global risk-aversion nor global risk-seeking. We will come back to this point in our Examples 3 and 6 in Section 5.
Remark 5. The quintessence of Corollary 1 already appears in the EU literature in the form of existence conditions for the integral (19) (cf. Nielsen 1984; Wakker 1993; Delbaen, Drapeau and Kupper 2011 and references therein) . A main insight from this literature is that boundedness of u is required for any EU representation de…ned over all random variables: for unbounded u we can always …nd random variables for which the integral (19) does not exist.
10 To see the connection between this literature and our Corollary 1, observe that any (non-constant) concave u is unbounded from below whereas any (non-constant) convex u is unbounded from above.
Remark 6. Beyond this purely decision-theoretic literature, macro-economists have observed that 'model uncertainty' may easily lead to exploding moments of expected utility functions (or of the stochastic discount factor) for unbounded utility functions that are standard in the literature (cf. Geweke 2001; Weitzman 2007 ). This insight culminated in Weitzman's (2009) Dismal Theorem about modeling preferences over random consumption streams: "Seemingly thin-tailed probability distributions (like the normal), which are actually only thin-tailed conditional on known structural parameters of the model (like the standard deviation), become tail-fattened (like the Student-t) after integrating out the structural-parameter uncertainty. This core issue is generic and cannot be eliminated in any clean way."(p.9)
Choquet expected utility
Consider now a utility representation (41) which is of the Choquet expected utility (CEU) form, i.e., for all X 2 L 0 ( ),
where the integral in (20) is the Choquet integral with respect to a nonatomic capacity on ( ; ) that is equivalent to . The Choquet integral is formally de…ned as
(for details on Choquet integration and properties of the Choquet integral see Schmeidler 1986 for bounded u and, more generally, Wakker 1993). We follow the literature and call convex i¤, for all A; B 2 ,
is called concave i¤ the inequality in (23) is reversed. CEU has been axiomatized in Schmeidler (1989) and in Gilboa (1987) whereby Schmeidler (1989) associates convex (resp. concave) with ambiguity/uncertainty aversion (resp. seeking) (cf. Footnote 8).
Since the CEU representation (20) is continuous, Proposition 4 implies that (20) cannot represent preferences that satisfy either quasi-concavity or quasi-convexity. For the EU representation (18) quasi-concavity (resp. quasi-convexity) of U is simply implied by concavity (resp. convexity) of u. The case is more complicated for the CEU representation (20) for which we must additionally consider properties of . In what follows we derive conditions that imply quasi-concavity of any CEU representation.
By Proposition 3 in Schmeidler (1986) , convexity of implies, for any 2 [0; 1],
which is equivalent to
since the Choquet integral is homogeneous of degree one. For concave u we have that
so that monotonicity of the Choquet integral implies, by (25),
, we obtain from (27) that
which is the de…nition of a quasi-concave E C (u ( )). Collecting the above arguments gives the following result (the argument for quasi-convexity proceeds analogously).
Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds such that U is of the CEU form (20). Then we can neither have (i) concavity of the utility function u combined with convexity of the capacity nor (ii) convexity of the utility function u combined with concavity of the capacity .
Loosely speaking, Corollary 2 establishes that a CEU representation over all random variables can neither express (i) global risk aversion combined with global ambiguity/uncertainty aversion nor (ii) global risk seeking combined with global ambiguity/uncertainty seeking.
Remark 7. Corollary 1 is obviously a special case of Corollary 2. Whenever the capacity is simultaneously convex and concave it becomes the additive measure so that the CEU representation (20) becomes the EU representation (18). Similar to our Remark 5 about unbounded utility functions in an EU representation, Schmeidler (1989,p.580) ensures existence of (20) by restricting attention to a bounded utility function u.
Examples
This section illustrates our analytical results through examples that relax di¤erent assumptions of Theorem 1 in order to ensure existence of preferences and/or their utility representations.
Example 1. [Relaxing non-triviality]. Just consider a degenerate preference relation such that 8X; Y 2 L 0 ( ) ; X Y . This preference relation is (trivially) complete, d 0 -continuous as well as S-convex (resp. s-convex). Moreover, it can be represented by any constant functional U :
Example 2. [Relaxing completeness: Monotonicity]. We say that Y dominates ( -a.e.) X, denoted X Y , i¤
Let 8X; Y 2 L 0 ( ) ; X Y i¤ X Y and observe that continuity and convexity hold for these incomplete preferences.
Example 3. [Relaxing completeness: Risk-averse expected utility for non-negative random variables]. Suppose that is only de…ned on the set of non-negative random
and consider an expected utility decision maker with the following utility function
The expected utility of any X 2 L 0 + ( ) is given as the distance (4) of X from the constantly zero random variable:
This decision maker's preferences on L 0 + ( ) are continuous and, by strict concavity of u on R + , they are also S-convex on L 0 + ( ). On the one hand, this example shows that continuity and convexity can be easily reconciled if we restrict attention to preferences that are only complete on a suitable subset of L 0 ( ) like L 0 + ( ) (cf. Remark 1). On the other hand, however, this example also demonstrates that incompleteness can be a very unnatural assumption: Why should the decision maker not have preferences over random variables with losses (negative x) in their support? We come back to this situation in Example 6 where we consider complete preferences.
Example 4. [Relaxing continuity: Lexicographic preferences]. De…ne (strict) dominance on an event E 2 as follows: 8X; Y 2 L 0 ( )
Fix a collection 1 ; 2 ; ::: of nested events in such that i+1 i , ( 1 ) = 1 and ( i ) > ( i+1 ) > 0 for all i. De…ne the following lexicographic preferences:
First, let us show that the (complete and non-trivial) preference relation is Sconvex. If not, then X Y but Y + (1 ) X X for some . Focus on the strict case X Y . Then there exists some i 1 and X; Y such that
X, a contradiction. Now focus on X Y so that, by the same argument, neither Y < j Y + (1 ) X nor X < j Y + (1 ) X for any j, implying Y + (1 ) X X. Next observe that is not d 0 -continuous. To see this, let 1 = E 1 [ E 2 , 2 = E 1 and consider the following random variables:
Example 5. [Relaxing continuity: Preferences generated by a linear functional]. Suppose that there exists a non-zero linear functional f on L 0 ( ). Then we can use f to construct a non-trivial, complete, and convex preference relation as follows:
This preference relation is non-trivial since f is non-zero (and by linearity thus nonconstant). It is complete since for all X; Y 2 L 0 ( ) we have either Zorn' s Lemma. Suppose that a non-empty partially ordered set (Z; R) has the property that every chain has an upper bound, i.e., for any totally ordered set C Z there exists M C such that X RM C for all X 2 C. Then the set Z contains at least one maximal element M, i.e., there is no X 2 Z with MRX and :X RM. Now let us construct a linear functional f 1 as follows: for every X 2 L 0 ( ), there are real numbers fx m g m2M such that X = P m2M x m m. Let f 1 (X) := x 1 : Since M is a basis, the representation X = P m2M x m m is unique, and as a result f 1 is well de…ned and linear.
Example 6. [Relaxing convexity: Expected utility with a reference point at zero]. Recall the situation of Example 3 but assume now a complete preference ordering on L 0 ( ). De…ne the following (once-di¤erentiable) utility function:
resulting in an EU representation of continuous preferences on L 0 ( ). As under Example 3, the expected utility of any -a.e. positive X is its distance d 0 (X; 0) from the constant zero random variable. For an -a.e. negative Y we have
that is, the expected utility of the negative Y is the negative of its distance from this zero random variable. Consequently, U (X) 2 ( 1; 1) for any X 2 L 0 ( ).
Observe that u is strictly concave for all x > 0 and strictly convex for all x < 0 so that the EU decision maker is risk-averse for positive and risk-seeking for negative outcomes. From Corollary 1 we know that an EU representation of a preference relation on L 0 ( ) is impossible for an utility function that is concave (or convex) on the whole domain R. This example shows that we can have an EU representation of preferences on L 0 ( ) when we are prepared to give up S-convexity (corresponding to a concave u,
i.e., risk-aversion) as well as s-convexity (corresponding to a convex u, i.e., risk-seeking) as global properties. Finally, let us interpret u as a value function from prospect theory (cf. Wakker 2010) such that positive x correspond to gains with respect to the reference point zero whereas negative x stand for losses. Under this interpretation giving up on S-and s-convexity for the above preferences is nothing else than the standard assumption of prospect theory according to which the bounded value function for gains is (strictly) concave whereas it is (strictly) convex for losses (cf. Vendrik and Woltjer 2007 and references therein).
Example 7. [Relaxing convexity: Value-at-Risk]. Recall the de…nition of Value at Risk (VaR) as a popular risk measure in …nancial applications which is not sub-additive:
for a …xed con…dence level 1
It is easy to see that (the complete and non-trivial) is d 0 -continuous because d 0 -continuity implies convergence in distribution. The following example taken from Embrechts et al. (2002) shows that S-convexity is violated. Let X; Y be two independent Pareto distributed random variables with F X (x) = F Y (x) = 1 x 1=2 ; x 1 and 0, otherwise. Then it is easy to see that
. That is, we have X; Y 2 S(X) but not X+Y 2 2 S(X) so that S-convexity fails. As the basis for the Basel II and III capital requirement formula, the VaR criterion has been heavily criticized in the mathematical …nance literature because it does not satisfy preference for diversi…cation (cf. Artzner et al. 1997 Artzner et al. , 1999 . On the other hand, VaR has the nice feature to ensure continuity of preferences on L 0 ( ), which is impossible for convex/coherent/subadditive risk measures (see Remark 4).
6 Discussion: Our topology of choice
Mathematical continuity is a relative concept that is determined by the topology we impose on L 0 ( ). We will show in a moment that it is easy to come up with topologies on L 0 ( ) that can reconcile convexity with mathematical continuity with respect to these topologies. This raises the question why we have chosen the topology of convergence in probability.
The remainder of this section presents three arguments in favor of the d 0 -metric as our topology of choice. These arguments can be summarized as follows:
1. A utility representation over the distributions of random variables is continuous if, and only if, d 0 -continuity holds.
2. The d 0 -metric is behaviorally plausible and it translates the standard convergence behavior of random variables from familiar L p ( ) spaces into the larger L 0 ( ) space.
3. Any alternative topologies we can think of that reconcile convexity with mathematical continuity require behaviorally implausible notions of convergence.
Continuous utility representation over distributions
Let us assume that a non-trivial and complete preference relation on L 0 ( ) can be represented by some utility function de…ned over the distributions of all random variables in L 0 ( ). 11 Recall that the distribution F Z of any Z 2 L 0 ( ) is a probability measure on the Borel subsets of the real line satisfying
Assumption 2. Fix some non-trivial and complete preference relation on L 0 ( ) and suppose that there exists some real-valued U such that, for all X; Y 2 L 0 ( ),
11 The majority of utility representations reduces preferences over random variables to preferences over distributions. Notable exceptions are state-dependent utility models. For a good textbook treament of state-dependent expected utility see Chapter 6.E in Mas-Collel et al. (1995) . For a recent overview on objective and subjective models with state-dependent utility see Karni and Schmeidler (2016) and references therein.
For a sequence of random variables fY k g k2N we write F Y k ) F Y whenever the Y k converge in distribution to Y , i.e., whenever the cumulative distribution functions (=cdf) of the Y k converge weakly to the cdf of Y . 12 We say that U is continuous in distribution
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. U is continuous in distribution if, and only if, is d 0 -continuous.
Most decision-theoretic applications are concerned with the maximization of utility functions over distributions whereby-mainly out of analytical convenience-these utility functions are supposed to be continuous. By Proposition 5, such analytical convenience would not be at hand without d 0 -continuity.
L p ( ) spaces and the d 0 -metric
Beyond the mere mathematical de…nition of continuity there is also a behavioral interpretation of what it means that a decision maker has 'continuous preferences'. According to this behavioral interpretation of continuity, preferences should not abruptly switch in the limit of converging random variables. A good behavioral concept of continuity should therefore be based on a behaviorally plausible concept of convergence that closely captures what real-life decision makers may perceive as convergence of random variables. Let us consider the familiar L p ( ) spaces with 1 p 1 which only contain random variables that come with an expected value. 13 The standard topology imposed on these spaces is generated by the L p -norm
with corresponding metric
Arguably, most decision-theorists would agree that convergence in the d p -metric is a behaviorally plausible notion for the convergence behavior of random variables in L p ( ).
12 Denote by CDF Z the cdf of Z, formally de…ned as
The CDF Y k converge weakly to the
for all x such that (Y = x) = 0; (for more details see Chapter 14 in Billingsley 1995 
6.3 Alternative topologies that establish compatibility between convexity and continuity
To see that it is actually trivial to ensure compatibility of convexity with some notion of mathematical continuity, let us …rst consider the discrete topology on L 0 ( ) generated
In this topology all subsets of L 0 ( ) are closed to the e¤ect that convexity and d 
Arguably, most real-life decision makers would judge that (or: behave as if) the Y k were increasingly resembling Y for larger k whereby the di¤erence between the Y k and Y becomes negligible in the limit. But then any behaviorally relevant concept of continuity should be based on the notion that the Y k are indeed converging to Y , which is not the case under d D -continuity.
The discrete topology stands for the largest topology under which any given convex preference relation over equivalence classes of random variables becomes continuous. Alternatively, we might consider the smallest topology under which a given convex preference relation becomes continuous. More precisely, …x some convex preference relation and introduce the smallest topology whose closed sets consist of a basis given by super-and sub-level sets s(X); S(X); 8X 2 L 0 ( ). Indeed, this topology is the smallest topology under which is continuous and it is also included in any such topology. However, the same criticism as under Example 8 applies: Making the (convex) lexicographic preferences of Example 4 continuous is incompatible with any topology in which Y belongs to some closed set containing all Y k . As in the case of the discrete topology, the notion of convergence required to make the preferences of Example 4 continuous is therefore not plausible from a behavioral perspective. So far we have considered topologies that treat random variables which coincidealmost everywhere as identical objects. If we are prepared to give up this notion of equivalence classes of random variables, preference relations on L 0 ( ) become possible that can combine convexity with mathematical continuity. 
The analysis in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1978, p.114 ) implies that, for any ! 2 [0; 1), f ! (X) = X(!) is a continuous functional. Consequently, for any …xed ! 2 [0; 1), the complete preference relation de…ned by
is continuous. Obviously, this preference relation is also convex.
Preferences described under Example 9 su¤er from the interpretational drawback that the decision maker must care about probability zero events under our assumption of an atomless . In our opinion, it is behaviorally more plausible for decision makers to treat random variables as identical objects in case they are identical almost everywhere.
Remark 8. Example 9 also demonstrates why the assumption of a nonatomic measure space is crucial to our analysis. Suppose, for example, that (!) > 0 with ! given by (48). Then the preferences of Example 9 are (i) convex as well as continuous whereby (ii) the decision maker's preferences no longer depend on a probability zero event.
Appendix: Formal proofs Proof of Proposition 1. Let L be a convex subset of L 0 ( ) with non-empty interior and suppose that Y 2 L 0 ( ) belongs to the interior of L. Fix some > 0 such that
. Pick some partition f 1 ; :::; n g of such that ( i ) ; i = 1; :::; n, which always exists for nonatomic . Choose Z 2 L 0 ( ) arbitrarily and introduce Y i = Y + nZ1 i where 1 i denotes the indicator function on i . For any i = 1; :::; n we have
Consequently, we have Y i 2 L for all i = 1; :::; n. Next note that
By convexity of L, we thus have
Since Z 2 L 0 ( ) was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain L = L 0 ( ), which proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. Ad part (a).
Step 1. Suppose that S (X) is convex. By non-triviality, we have Y 6 2 S (X) which implies S (X) 6 = L 0 ( ). By Proposition 1, S (X) must thus have an empty interior with respect to the topology of convergence in probability on L 0 ( ).
Step 2. By non-triviality, we also have that the set
is non-empty because of Z 2 S (X).
Step 3. Combining Step 1 and Step 2 establishes that S (X) cannot be an open set in the topology of convergence in probability. However, by completeness,
so that s (X) cannot be a closed set, which contradicts d 0 -continuity.
Ad part (b). Just observe that non-triviality implies (i), by s (X) 6 = L 0 ( ) and Proposition 1, that s (X) has an empty interior as well as (ii) non-emptiness of
By an analogue argument as under Step 3, the set
is thus not closed. Ad part (c). The validness of this statement is demonstrated through the examples in Section 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove part (a). If S (X) = fXg there is nothing to prove so let us assume that Y; Z 2 S (X) with Y 6 = Z. Without loss of generality, suppose that, by completeness, Y Z. If quasi-concavity holds, we have
Proof of Theorem 3. By Theorem 2 it is su¢ cient to show that quasi-concave preferences follow from preference for diversi…cation under the assumptions of Theorem 3.
Step 1. Without loss of generality, suppose that X Y with X 6 = Y (again: if S (X) = fXg, we don't have anything to prove). We have to show that preference for diversi…cation implies X X + (1 ) Y
for 2 [0; 1]. If X Y , we immediately obtain (58). So, let us assume X Y:
Step 2 
for all jq 0 qj .
Step 3 
By transitivity, we have X X + (1 ) Y
i¤ 2 [0; q ]. If q = 1, we have the desired result (58). Suppose now 0 q < 1. By X Y , d 0 -continuity and completeness implies that the set
is open. Consequently, there exists some number > 0 such that d 0 (Y; Z) implies X Z, i.e., Z 2 S (X). By Lemma 1, there exists some > 0 such that d 0 (Y; X + (1 ) Y ) for all . Consequently, for all , X X +(1 ) Y implying q > 0. That is, we can henceforth assume that 0 < q < 1.
Step 4. We claim that q < 1 implies X q X + (1 q ) Y . We prove this claim by way of contradiction. First, suppose that X q X + (1 q ) Y . By Lemma 1 and openness of the set S (X), there exists some > 0 such that
for all jq 0 q j . Let q 0 = min 1; q + 1 2
and observe that q 0 > q as well as X q 0 X + 1 q 0 Y . But this contradicts the de…nition of q .
Next, suppose that X q X + (1 q ) Y . An analogous argument as above results in some q 0 such that q 0 < q as well as q 0 X + 1 q 0 Y X. Again, a contradiction to the de…nition of q .
Step 5. In
Step 4 we have proven that X q X + (1 q ) Y whenever q < 1 By preference for diversi…cation, we thus obtain
,
for all 2 [0; 1]. By de…nition of q ,
for all 2 [0; 1], which only holds for q = 1. But this contradicts q < 1 and gives us the desired result (58).
Proof of Proposition 4. d 0 -continuity is violated if, and only if, there exists some sequence of random variables fY k g k2N with d 0 (Y k ; Y ) ! 0 such that X Y k for all k but Y X. By Assumption 1, we then have that U (X) U (Y k ) for all k and U (Y ) < U (X), which violates continuity of U . Consequently, continuity of U requires d 0 -continuity. Moreover, by Assumption 1, quasi-concave (resp. quasi-convex) preferences require a quasi-concave (resp. quasi-convex) U . The proposition then follows from Theorem 2. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that f 2 L p ( ) and g 2 L q ( ) with either 
For any X; Y 2 L p ( ), let
so that (68) becomes
Since kgk q 1, convergence in d p implies convergence in d 0 on L p ( ).
